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THE NON-MERGER VIRTUAL MERGER:
IS CORPORATE LAW READY FOR VIRTUAL REALITY?
BY STuART R. COHN*
ABSTRACT
The term "virtual mergers" describes the relatively recent
phenomenon of companies entering into contractual arrangements that are
functionally, but not legally, equivalent to mergers prescribed by corporate
statutes. Virtual mergers usually involve the shared use of assets
contributed by each of the companies. A central element of the transaction
is that the two companies remain legally independent, each with its own
directors, officers, and shareholders. The arrangements can usually be
terminated by either party, allowing each company to return to the status
quo ante or exercise buyout rights if contractually provided.
Although virtual mergers have occurred among public companies
in Europe, no US. public company has yet engaged in such a transaction.
The advantages of the transaction are very likely to lead to its use in this
country among both public and smaller companies. The application of
corporate statutes to a virtual merger is not clear. This article examines
the issue of shareholder voting and whether, and to what extent, current
statutory provisions andjudicial interpretation support shareholder voting
and appraisal rights in these unusual forms of corporate combination.
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I. THE VIRTUAL MERGER PHENOMENON
A. Introduction
It is only a matter of time before United States companies employ
a form of corporate combination utilized in Europe that has become known
as the "virtual merger."' Virtual mergers are functionally, but not legally,
equivalent to mergers commonly understood under corporate law.
Although the transaction format has attracted little attention or comment in
this country, its advantages suggest that the import of the virtual merger to
the United States is inevitable. Corporate law will be strained to adjust to
this novel legal paradigm. A period of uncertainty within the business and
legal communities will necessarily ensue regarding the "fit" of the virtual
merger transaction into corporate statutory and case law. Among the
principal issues will be shareholder voting and appraisal rights, in particular
'Virtual mergers of European-based companies are described in Peter H. Blessing, Virtual
Mergers, 10 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT
VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 297 (2000); James L. Dahlberg
& Jay D. Perry, Tracking Stock: Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and Virtual Mergers and
Acquisitions, 10 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQuISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS,
JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 241 (2000).
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whether functional combinations of independent entities invoke elements
of corporate democracy that are the basis for shareholder action in
traditional merger contexts.
The virtual merger transaction raises issues similar to the "de facto
merger" doctrine. But the analogy is not complete. Virtual mergers also
raise questions under sale of assets analogies, delegation of management
authority, and fiduciary duties. The latter is evidenced by the recent
Omnicare decision in Delaware,2 which examined fiduciary duties of the
board in the context of negotiated mergers. The court's admonition that
"Delaware corporation law expressly provides for a balance of power
between boards and stockholders which makes merger transactions a shared
enterprise and ownership decision"3 could well be applied to business
combinations that emulate mergers but are effected outside of traditional
statutory processes.
The issues raised by the virtual merger transaction are at the core of
a larger, more significant question, namely the extent to which shareholders
ought to have a voice in fundamental business restructuring. The history
of corporate law has been one of continual erosion of shareholder voting
powers. In the nineteenth century, mergers required the unanimous consent
of shareholders. That standard was reduced to an absolute majority when
appraisal rights were developed.4 It was then further reduced to a majority
of the quorum, 5 and in some instances the shareholder vote has been
entirely eliminated.6 The trend against shareholder voting is also seen in
the recent MBCA amendment to sale of assets provisions, where
shareholder voting is eliminated if the company retains at least twenty-five
percent of it assets.7
Acceptance of the virtual merger concept can effect a significant
alteration in shareholder powers without statutory amendment, and it would
be another major step away from shareholder authority. If virtual mergers
can occur without shareholder approval and the related requirements of
disclosure and appraisal, company managements will surely prefer a board-
2Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
31d. at 930.
4WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQuIsITIONS 19 (2000) (noting that the appraisal
remedy was adopted to avoid the veto power of shareholders).
3MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § I 1.04(e) (2001).
61n some states, shareholders of the acquiring, surviving corporation do not have a vote
if there is no change in their share holdings or the corporation's articles of incorporation. MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT § 11.04(g) (2001). Exchange and NASDAQ listing conditions impose voting
requirements that might not otherwise exist, particularly if the merger will involve the issuance
by the acquiring company of more than a specific percentage of additional shares.
7MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02(a) (2001).
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controlled process over the slower, riskier, disclosure-oriented statutory
merger provisions. By imposing shareholder rights upon the functionally
equivalent virtual mergers, existing statutory policies will be preserved.8
Thus, two underlying themes of this article are the balance of power
between management and shareholders and the checks and balances that are
appropriate in material operational decisions.
B. The Problem of Definition
What is a "virtual merger?" There is no bright-line definition. The
few articles that have been written to date have not attempted to define the
term. Although this article provides a description of principal features, any
current definition of "virtual merger" is ambiguous at best. In dealing with
result and function, not form and process, there is a danger in the "virtual
merger" analysis of relying upon Justice Stewart's infamous "I know it
when I see it" test.9 Indeed, that standard has been employed in some de
facto merger cases.'0 Despite definitional uncertainties, Part IV proposes
objective guidelines for application of voting and appraisal processes. The
guidelines are based on a combination of three principal factors: (1) the
amount of assets transferred to joint control of the combining entities, (2)
the degree of control retained by the transferring parties, and (3) the
intended duration of the combined venture.
C. Virtual Mergers Compared to Traditional Alliance Forms
Intercorporate agreements not rising to the level of formal mergers
are common, and are generally regarded as within the sole discretion of the
board of directors. Joint ventures, strategic alliances, cross-ownership of
'Inasmuch as voting and appraisal rights are not accorded in many standard forms of
merger and acquisitions, one may legitimately inquire why shareholder rights should exist for a
diluted form of merger, the virtual merger. The answer lies, in my judgment, in the extraordinary
nature of the virtual merger, which usually involves an abdication of control over corporate assets
and a delegation of authority to non-elected management. These concerns are discussed infra
Parts III and IV.
9Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion) (referring to an
attempt to define hard-core pornography for First Amendment purposes).
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.
Id.
"Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Iowa 1965) (characterizing a
reorganization plan as a merger "under any definition of merger we know").
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stock, and joint research and exploration efforts are common practices that
typically require only board approval. These transactions are generally
contractual in nature. Similarly, virtual mergers are contractual rather than
statutory alliances.
Virtual mergers differ from other forms of alliance principally in
degree rather than kind, but the differences may be significant. Virtual
mergers are analogous to a joint venture. The main difference is that
virtual mergers involve a significant percentage of assets allocated to joint
control by each of the combining parties. Oil companies that share costs
of exploration and drilling expend huge resources in the joint venture, but
the bulk of their business operations remain independent. Automobile
companies that agree to develop and market a new model may combine
enormous resources, but again their independent businesses continue to be
their dominant activities.
The terms virtual merger and joint venture are of course merely
labels, legal conclusions based on a set of objective facts. What some
parties might call joint ventures could be functional mergers. Indeed,
labeling could be part of an attempt to avoid statutory processes and
disclosure obligations. This article will use the term joint venture to
indicate combined activities that do not involve significant interdependence
of principal business operations. Although there is no template for a virtual
merger, such functional combinations generally:
- involve a significant portion of the business operations
of at least one of the two entities;
- result in ajointly-owned management unit that controls
the use of the assets contributed by each of the parties;
- retain the distinct legal status, management, and
shareholding groups of each of the respective
companies;
- permit either party to withdraw from the arrangement;
and
- permit the parties, following withdrawal, to (i) reclaim
their respectively contributed assets or (ii) effect a
buyout of the withdrawing company's interest, which
would include the contributed assets."
"Stuart M. Lockman & Tracy E. Silverman, Formation of Hybrid-Type Organizations:
Virtual Mergers of Health Care Systems, 72 FLA. B.J. 14, 16-17 (1998).
2004]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
In this author's opinion, a virtual merger differs from a typical
merger or acquisition effected pursuant to statutory corporate law in several
respects:
- a virtual merger is governed by contract without
reference to statutorily determined procedures or
consequences;
- a virtual merger does not result in the absorption of one
company by another;
_ a virtual merger does not result in cash-outs or
exchanges with either shareholding group;
- the combining parties in a virtual merger retain either
direct or residual ownership in the assets being
contributed to the venture;
- each of the combining parties has the right to terminate
the relationship and return to the status quo ante or
apply other agreed upon termination provisions.
A recent case involving two hospitals in Poughkeepsie, New York,
illustrates a virtual merger transaction. 2 Limited financial resources
caused the hospitals to enter into a joint venture to create several jointly
operated care and diagnostic facilities. 3 The success of the cooperative
venture whetted the appetites of the hospital administrations, and one year
later they entered into an agreement "to more closely integrate . . . to
eliminate costly duplication of services" and "not to compete.., with one
another" for the provision of similar services. 4 The hospitals retained their
separate identities and ownership structures but used the joint venture
entity to coordinate operational decisions. The joint venture management
negotiated with insurers regarding rates and terms of service, allocated
patients to the respective hospitals, and determined the appropriate division
of general surgery revenues. The cooperative effort caught the attention of
the New York Antitrust Division, which sought to apply state antitrust laws
to the hospitals' relationship. The Division's action was successful, and the
court concluded that what began as a legitimate collaboration for limited
2New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Saint Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
The case is discussed in Jack A. Rovner, When Collaboration Becomes Collusion: State of New
York ex rel Spitzer v. Saint Francis Hospital, 12 HEALTH LAW. 1 (2000).
3The hospitals combined operations for a cardiac catheritization laboratory, MRI unit,
and mobile lithotripter. Rovner, supra note 12, at 4.
14Spitzer, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 405-06.
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purposes had evolved into horizontal collusion that decreased consumer
choice and price competition.'
This situation is not unusual. Rising costs of medical care and
restrictive insurance practices create significant pressures among hospitals
to reduce duplicative services, provide access to services not currently
offered, and avoid the effects of market competition. Although some
mergers have occurred, many hospitals have preferred the "virtual" route
to maintain their individual identities. As one commentator noted:
Today, health care systems frequently are forgoing traditional
mergers and consolidations in favor of forming hybrid-type
organizations (HTOs).... HTOs typically take the form of
either a JOA [(joint operating agreement)] or a holding
company model. A JOA consists of a contractual
arrangement which may, but need not, involve the creation of
a separate corporation, partnership, or limited liability
company (JOC) to oversee the operations of the participating
health care systems. Each participant retains ownership of its
assets and continues to be liable for its own liabilities ....
[H]owever, the participants' operations are both financially
and structurally integrated.' 6
To date there have been no virtual mergers involving a publicly-held
United States company. Eventual adoption of the virtual merger
transaction is inevitable, however, as companies recognize its merits. 7
High tech industries are especially fertile grounds for joint ventures that
could combine assets and management. The volatility of the high tech
industry might lead companies to seek organizational relationships that
offer both the potential of synergy and the ability to resume independent
courses in case conditions alter. Alliances can also be expected in
industries such as pharmaceuticals, oil, and communications, where
research costs are extraordinarily high relative to benefit uncertainties.
"Id. at 415 ("Here, defendants have engaged in an ongoing horizontal arrangement to
divide the market for healthcare services in Poughkeepsie.").
'Lockman & Silverman, supra note 11, at 14.
7In February 2001, Coca Cola and Proctor& Gamble announced plans to create ajointly-
owned limited liability company that would control the marketing of Coca Cola's Minute Maid
juices and P&G's Pringles chips and Sunny Delightjuice drinks. Nikhil Drogon & Betsy McKay,
Coke and P&G Plan to Create a $4.2 Billion Juice and Snack Company, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2 1,
2001, at B I. Although the planned alliance did not go forward, the proposed relationship could
have suited the virtual merger construct.
2004]
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D. Advantages of the Virtual Merger
There are strong reasons to expect that the virtual merger transaction
is just around the proverbial corner. In Europe, the transaction has been
used principally in cross-border alliances where differing merger statutes
and tax regulations posed problems with complete integrations.'" Similar
concerns may arise if U.S.-based companies desire to merge with foreign
entities.' 9 Tax and other concerns can arise as well in purely domestic
combinations leading to virtual mergers between domestic companies.2"
Virtual mergers are particularly suitable in circumstances where
neither company desires to give up permanent control of its assets and
future business opportunities. Although any merger can theoretically be
dissolved, parties to a virtual merger expressly provide for potential
termination, and can plan for the reallocation and return of contributed
assets if anticipated synergies are not achieved.
The ability to back out of an unfavorable alliance with a company's
original assets and corporate structure intact is a key advantage over
traditional merger transactions. There are undoubtedly many companies
and shareholders today that wish they could undo various full-fledged
mergers and return to the status quo ante.2' Moreover, the companies retain
"See Blessing, supra note 1, at 299:
In certain cases involving potential cross-border business combinations of
publicly listed companies, conventional legal forms ofcombination... may not
be viable for tax, legal, commercial or intangible reasons. For example .... the
combination may give rise to tax to the shareholders of one of the partners or
even to an entity-level tax. The EC Merger Directive, and local implementing
legislation, has dramatically reduced the frictions.., but has no relevance where
one or both parties are not members of the EC. Even if the combination could
be arranged in a tax-efficient manner, if the combination is intended to be a
"merger of equals" and the desirable tax structure is inconsistent with the
intended commercial perception, its viability may be vitiated.
Id.
'Sally A. Thurston, Planning Techniques for International Mergers and Acquisitions,
10 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUIS ITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 251,274 (1999) ("Since the companies have
not merged, many legal and regulatory approvals are presumably resolved.")
2 E.g., Eric B. Sloan et al., Through the Looking Glass: Seeing Corporate Problems as
Partnership Opportunities, 3 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS,
SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 1037, 1050
(1999) (discussing use of a virtual merger to avoid taxation in a Morris Trust transaction in which
A would acquire B after B spins offC. Instead of A acquiring B, which would likely be a taxable
transaction, A and B would agree to conduct all of their business operations through a jointly-
managed LLC.)
2
'Jennifer Steinhaver, Hospital Mergers Stumbling as Marriages of Convenience, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at AI (citing problems incurred in some hospital mergers).
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their independent boards, officers, and shareholders, thereby preserving
opportunities for business development and capital financing in areas not
controlled by the virtual merger transaction. Sometimes, as was the case
in Poughkeepsie, a formal merger is not pursued because the respective
entities serve different social or community missions.22 At other times
virtual mergers may be motivated by the desire to avoid shareholder voting
or merger provisions-a motivation hardly in keeping with corporate
democracy principles but unquestionably a factor in the structuring of
transactions. 23 Even if the virtual merger transaction was not designed to
avoid shareholder action, shareholder input and disclosure on fundamental
corporate changes are established principles of corporate democracy.
E. The Uncertainty of Statutory Application
The virtual merger phenomenon has yet to attract significant
corporate law attention. The relatively few commentaries in this area focus
on tax24 and antitrust concerns. 2' There has been little discussion regarding
whether and to what extent virtual mergers are subject to corporate
governance requirements applicable to traditional merger models.
Procedural requirements for mergers and acquisitions, including
consolidations, statutory mergers, share exchanges, and asset transactions,
are well prescribed in state statutes. 26  Although twists on the basic
22The alliance involved a secular and a Catholic hospital, causing policy concerns that
mitigated against merger. See New York ex. rel. Spitzer v. Saint Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d
399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
'Subjecting the proposed transaction to shareholder vote could have several adverse
consequences. Public disclosure ofthe terms could lead to competing bids from other companies,
substantial delay in implementation of the proposed joint activities, critiques from analysts and
institutional investors, and possible large cash payouts to dissenting shareholders. The perceived
downsides are, conversely, reasons that support opening virtual merger transactions to shareholder
and public scrutiny.
24Blessing, supra note 1; Dahlberg & Perry, supra note 1; Thurston, supra note 19; IRS
Officials Consider Cross-Border Exchangeable Stock Deals, TAx NOTES TODAY, Jan. 29, 1999,
at 19-3.
2
"Rovner, supra note 12; Mark J. Botti, Comments on the Antitrust Aspects of Hospital
Virtual Mergers, 1175 HEALTH CARE M&A: STRATEGIES AND DEALS NOW AND FOR THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 205 (2000) (presented by the Health Care Task Force, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dept.
of Justice, at the American Health Lawyers Association Annual Meeting, July 1, 1998); Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,161 (2003)
(issuedjointly by the Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division of U.S. Dept. of Justice).
26There is a fair degree of uniformity among states regarding shareholder approval of
mergers and acquisitions. Variations occur in voting percentages required for shareholder
approvals and in provisions that except shareholder voting, particularly for surviving companies.
This article will usually cite to the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), which has been
substantially adopted in a majority of states.
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statutory models occur, such as triangular and reverse triangular mergers,
each variation can be fit within statutory analysis.2" The statutory fit is not
as readily apparent for virtual mergers. In a virtual merger, the
shareholders of both entities have had no change in their shareholder
interests. Their company's identity has not been altered, and shareholders
continue to have the right to elect company management and to vote on
matters provided by law or charter. Although corporate assets have been
transferred to the control of a new entity, the company's continuing
managerial input into the employment of those assets may argue against the
notion that there has been a disposition of assets warranting a shareholder
vote. In short, current statutory provisions regarding mergers and asset
transactions do not explicitly fit the virtual merger mode.
Corporate law is no stranger to the application of statutory standards
to nonconforming commercial transactions. Courts have avoided rigid
literalism in such matters as the de facto existence of corporations," the
scope of ultra vires,29 whether shareholder debt should be deemed equity,3"
and the application of statutory procedures to "de facto" mergers.3 The
recent growth of "tracking stock" is simply another illustration of the
corporate world's fascination with the thin line between abstraction and
reality.32 The virtual merger presents a new challenge. In form it is not a
merger, but in function it is. If shareholder approval is a sine qua non of
the merger process, does the policy requiring shareholder voting apply to
the non-statutory virtual merger transaction? Even more fundamentally, is
2 Triangular and reverse triangular mergers both involve the merger of two corporations.
The main differences with so-called statutory mergers involve the identities of the merging parties
and the surviving corporation. Neither of the differences negate the express application of
statutory provisions.
2 Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 398 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1979)
(explaining that corporation existed de facto even if not de jure because of a bona fide attempt to
organize and actual exercise of corporate powers).
29Jacksonville, Mayport, Pablo Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514, 526
(1896) (stating that a charter limiting activities to a railroad company did not preclude the
company from operating a resort hotel and engaging in other transactions auxiliary or incidental
to its main business).
"°Arnold v. Phillips (In re Southern Brewing Co.), 117 F.2d 497, 502 (5th Cir. 1941)
(holding that initial contribution to start-up company deemed to be capital even though evidenced
by demand notes).
3 See generally Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136 N.W.2d 410, 415-18 (Iowa 1965)
(applying merger provisions to transactions despite structuring under non-merger provisions).
32 Dahlberg & Perry, supra note 1, at 248, 251 ("[T]he most significant and compelling
reason for a corporation to issue tracking stock is to create a formalistic separation of two distinct
businesses, withoutlosing control of either business."). Tracking stock, in a sense, is the converse
of a virtual merger. In the former instance, a single company creates two nominally independent
shareholding groups. In the latter, two independent entities create a single operational unit.
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this a question that can be addressed by courts, or are courts bound by
legislative mandates that define the limited circumstances in which
shareholders are given the right to approve or disapprove proposed
transactions?33
This article examines virtual mergers in the context of corporate
governance issues, in particular the issue of shareholder voting rights and
appraisal rights. Director and officer fiduciary duties are also implicated,
as there is the potential for conflict of interest concerns as well as questions
of full devotion to a company's corporate interests. Part II of this article
will examine the virtual merger phenomenon and the alternative forms of
corporate combination. Part III will discuss whether the virtual merger
transaction fits into current legal modes requiring shareholder approval.
Part IV will present a suggested approach to applying corporate standards
to the virtual merger transaction. The direction of these comments is that
traditional statutory modes and procedures should not inhibit acceptance of
new forms of corporate combination. At the same time, the potential
impact of the proposed alliance may be so significant as to warrant a
shareholder disclosure and approval process.
II. VIRTUAL MERGER TOPOLOGY
There is no fixed template for virtual mergers. Any transaction
between entities that results in joint control over assets and operations
might be termed a virtual merger. The following alternatives are among the
primary forms.
A. Equalization Agreement
An equalization agreement seeks to provide the shareholders of each
of the two companies with economic interests in the combined entities
equivalent to what would have been received in a traditional merger. As
described by one commentator:
In this structure, [the entities] do not merge, but simply
enter into an equalization agreement pursuant to which the
33Shareholder voting rights are limited by statute to defined circumstances, e.g.,
amendments to articles of incorporation, mergers, dissolution, election and removal of directors,
sale of all or substantially all assets, bylaw amendments, and matters on the agenda at annual and
special shareholders' meetings. There are no voting rights extended to shareholders beyond these
defined circumstances, except as might be set forth in the articles of incorporation. Hence the
question arises whether courts can intervene to create shareholder voting rights where the statute
is, at best silent, or, at worst, implicitly adverse.
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parties agree to an "equalization ratio" which dictates, among
other things, voting and dividend rights between the two
corporations. The two corporations agree to pay dividends at
the same time ... to vote on all shareholder issues together,
to manage the companies as though they were one corporation
and to cause the public companies to have parallel boards.34
In 1995, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), a United Kingdom corporation,
entered into an equalization agreement with Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia
(CRA), an Australian corporation, that amounted to a virtual merger." The
transaction, referred to by the parties as a Dual Listed Companies
Structure, 6 resulted in the functional merger of the two companies'
business operations, yet they maintained their separate identities, boards,
and shareholder groups. The agreement described the arrangement as
follows:
Under the DLC (Dual Listed Companies) merger structure,
RTZ and CRA will continue as separate publicly quoted
companies, retaining their corporate identities. The structure
does not involve any change in the legal or beneficial
ownership of any of the assets of the RTZ Group or the CRA
Group. Rather, the DLC merger is to be effected by
contractual arrangements and amendments to the companies'
memoranda and articles of association designed to ensure
that, as far as possible, the RTZ Group and the CRA Group
operate together as a single economic enterprise. Amongst
other things, the arrangements will:
confer upon the shareholders of RTZ and CRA a
common economic interest in both groups;
provide for common boards of directors and a unified
management structure;
provide for equalised dividends and capital
distributions;
- provide that the shareholders of RTZ and CRA will
take certain key decisions, including the election of
34Thurston, supra note 19, at 273.
3 Blessing, supra note 1, at 300 (describing an "example closest to a 'pure' equalization
arrangement").36The RTZ-CRA Dual Listed Companies Structure description can be found at
www.riotinto.com/library/reportspdfs/corppub-duallisted.pdf.
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directors, through ajoint electoral procedure in which
the Public Holders of the two companies will
effectively vote on a joint basis."
The respective voting strengths of the RTZ and CRA shareholders
were determined by comparative valuations of the two companies. A ten-
month comparison of stock market valuations resulted in a 76.5:23.5 ratio
in favor of RTZ. Thus, through the issuance by CRA of special voting
shares, RTZ shareholders held 76.5% of the combined voting power of the
two companies. Through a similar share issuance by RTZ, CRA
shareholders held 23.5% of the total voting power. Dividends would be
shared in proportion to the ratio of the combined voting powers.3" RTZ and
CRA mutually agreed that they would provide funds to the other if
necessary to pay their respective cash dividends.
Both RTZ and CRA retained their own boards of directors and
officers. Identical slates for board members were presented to both sets of
shareholders. The elected boards of the respective companies appointed an
identical set of officers to manage the two enterprises. Although the
companies were to be jointly managed, the parties recognized that there
might be some issues on which joint action was neither necessary nor
appropriate. Three voting categories were established:
(1) Joint Decisions: Significant matters affecting both
RTZ and CRA required approval by joint shareholder
vote. They included the election and removal of
directors, creation of new classes of shares, and any
conflict-of-interest transactions requiring shareholder
approval by applicable law.
(2) Class Rights Actions: Certain listed matters required
independent approval by the shareholders of each of
the two companies. They included such matters as
share redemptions, adjustments to the Equalisation
Ratio, and any other matter on which the two boards
agreed should be decided by separate shareholder
votes.
(3) Other Actions: Matters not listed within the Joint or
Class Action listings would be reserved for decision
solely by the shareholders of the affected corporation.
'71d. at 4.3
'Therefore, a dividend distribution would be allocated 76.5% to RTZ shareholders and
23.5% to CRA shareholders in accordance with the respective holdings of such shareholders.
2004]
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The RTZ-CRA Agreement provided for termination
through a Class Rights Action vote.39
Inasmuch as each of the two companies retained ownership of their
respective assets, it was not necessary to prepare a termination agreement
involving the division and distribution ofjointly-held assets. Instead, upon
termination, a valuation would be made by an independent third party of
each of the respective net assets of the two companies. To the extent that
the ratio of the net asset valuations did not match the Equalisation Ratio,
the company on the excess side of the valuation would pay to the other an
amount that would result in the respective net assets equaling the
Equalisation Ratio.
B. Jointly-Owned Operating Companies
A functional combination can be created by each of the entities
transferring assets to a jointly-owned operating company. The starting
point is once again the respective valuations of the companies. Valuation
may be based on market capitalizations when publicly-traded companies
are involved, or any other basis considered appropriate under the
circumstances. If less than all the assets are subject to the combined
operations, valuation is limited to the transferred assets. Valuation results
in a ratio that determines respective voting strengths in and distributions by
the jointly-owned company. Both of the transferring companies continue
to exist independently, continue to have their own directors, officers, and
shareholders, and are entitled to dividends and distributions based on an
agreed formula. The boards of the combining companies jointly select the
board of directors (if a corporation) or managers (if an LLC) of the jointly-
owned company. The shareholders of the combining companies would
continue to elect their respective boards but are one step removed from
election of the joint operating company management. The situation is
analogous to a triangular merger in which the acquiring company's
shareholders are one entity removed from the merging parties, and therefore
do not have voting rights as to the merger.4°
An example of a jointly-owned operating company was the the so-
called "South Texas Project,"'" which involved the joint construction and
39Dual Listed Companies Structure, supra note 36, at 26-27.
"See infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
41Texas v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 609 S.W.2d 263, 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)
(holding that ad valorem taxes were not owing by the two municipal participants, the cities of
Austin and San Antonio).
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ownership of a nuclear-fueled electric generating plant by four entities,
consisting of two municipalities and two public utility companies. 4' The
relationship was governed by a "Participating Agreement," a sixty percent
vote was required for principal decisions (meaning in effect a three-quarters
approval by the participants), and a management team was composed of
representatives from each of the four participants. 43  Electric energy
generated at the Project was distributed to each of the participants in
accordance with their percentage interests, and was sold by each of them
to the public through their individual distribution systems.4 Although the
"Participating Agreement" had some elements analogous to a virtual
merger, the two commercial participants retained substantial portions of
their operations independent from the Project, and there was no sharing of
revenues or profits.40 The Project, however, is an example of the kind of
joint participation arrangement that, under differing circumstances, could
be deemed a virtual merger. The joint contribution of assets, common
control, and contractual provisions governing the rights among the parties
are principal elements of a virtual merger.
C. Control Share Acquisition
The transfer of a significant equity interest by one corporation to
another, along with an agreement by the parties to nominate directors and
officers, could effectively constitute a virtual merger. A number of states
have adopted Control Share Acquisition statutes as antitakeover measures.
These statutes generally provide that an acquirer of a certain percentage of
shares loses the voting rights to those shares unless approved by the
remaining shareholders. The percentage of shares acquired need not be
very high to constitute effective control, and the starting level for
application of these provisions is usually twenty percent of the outstanding
shares.46
'
2The participants and their respective ownership interests in the Project were the City of
Austin (16%), City of San Antonio (28%), Houston Lighting & Power Co. (30.8%), and Central
Power & Light Co. (25.2%). Id. at 266.
431d.
44d. at 267.
45Houston Lighting & Power, 609 S.W.2d at 268. The lack of shared profits was the
principal reason the court refused to find that a partnership existed among the participants. Id.
4Indiana's statute was upheld against constitutional challenge in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), and has served as a model for other states. The provisions,
however, generally do not apply to negotiated acquisitions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
607.0902(2)(d)(7) (West 2001).
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A variation on this theme is exemplified by the cross-ownership
transaction that General Motors (GM) and Fiat consummated in 2000.4"
GM purchased a twenty percent equity interest in Fiat in 2000, while Fiat
concurrently purchased a six percent interest in GM. 8 The agreement
included a "put option" that would eventually require GM to purchase the
remaining eighty percent of Fiat's equity.49 Although the transaction was
initially hailed as a "formidable union" by GM officials, it has fallen short
of the anticipated benefits.5 Fiat's financial problems forced it to sell its
stake in GM, and the parties have entered into discussions to relieve GM
of its obligation to purchase the remainder of Fiat's equity.5
D. Joint Management Entity
This functional combination involves a delegation of management
authority by the combining entities to a jointly-owned and controlled
management company. Assume that Companies A and B, engaged in
similar activities within the same market, agree to coordinate their
operations and leverage their combined purchasing power. A jointly-
owned management company is formed with equal ownership by each of
the combining companies, and the parties to the transaction designate the
board of directors and officers of the management company. The
management company is authorized to negotiate third-party contracts on
behalf of the companies, bill and collect for services and products on behalf
of each of the companies, allocate revenues in accordance with collections,
and perform such other functions as the two companies might agree. 2 This
is similar to the attempt by the Poughkeepsie hospitals to create efficiencies
4 See Alessandra Galloni & Gregory L. White, Fiat Co-CEO Galateri Resigns As Firm
Faces Car Unit's Woes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at A3.4 See Allessandra Galloni, Fiat Sells Entire Stake in GM to Meet Its Debt Agreements,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at A3. The two companies agreed to engage in joint purchasing of
parts and the sharing of designs for engines and transmissions. General Motors and Fiat, A Duo
ofDunces, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2002, at 63.
49Galloni & White, supra note 47, at A3.
50Galloni, supra note 48, at A3.
"I1d.
" Nissan Motor and Renault have created a holding company to oversee an alliance
formed in 1999. The holding company controls the joint purchasing of parts and sharing of basic
components for some automobile models. Suzanne Kapner, Nissan and Renault Are Said to
Fortify Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at C2. Brown-Forman Corp. and Bacardi Ltd. formed a
partnership to dealjointly with liquordistributors. Shelly Branch, Brown-Forman, Bacardi Form
an Alliance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2002, at B2.
[Vol. 29
THE NON-MERGER VIRTUAL MERGER
in marketing and cost management," which in that instance raised
substantial antitrust issues.
E. Alliances
Alliances are the least complex cooperative agreements from a
structural standpoint, and are often used by companies engaged in
complementary segments of the marketplace. Many of the nation's major
airlines have recently entered into code sharing agreements, which permit
the participating carriers to share reservation systems and coordinate their
respective routes and schedules.54 Biomedical companies have agreed to
share research efforts and technical information." These arrangements do
not involve co-ownership of any management or operating entity, division
of profits, or other elements present in arrangements that involve more
extensive combining of operational coordination. They do, however,
constrain each of the companies within the parameters of the alliance terms.
F. Other Arrangements: The Oil and Gas Industry
Perhaps no industry is as familiar with the virtual merger concept as
the oil and gas industry, because its members have utilized joint operating
agreements for years.56 These agreements bind the parties to joint
exploration and development programs while maintaining independent
ownership structures. Common arrangements in the industry include:
(A) Equity and contractual joint ventures between state-
owned enterprises and private oil companies. The
sovereign and the multinational oil company sharejoint
ownership of the entity, with the rights and obligations
of the parties being defined by contract.
(B) Participation agreements in which a single company
negotiates with a host country for a concession license
on behalf of a consortium of petroleum companies.
The participation arrangement is so common that a
3See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
4 Stephen Power et al., Delta-Northwest-Continental Plan Is Facing Restrictions Set by
DOT, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20,2003, at A2 (reporting that an agreement among airlines to allow each
to sell seats on other's flights is subject to antitrust scrutiny).
"Geeta Anand & Vanessa Fuhrmans, ImClone and Bristol-Myers Plan 3 Big Trials of
Their Cancer Drug, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at A3.
56See ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 463-64 (2d
ed. 2000).
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model form has been developed for management and
sharing arrangements among companies."
Although the size and scope of joint arrangements involve
substantial financial commitments, the ventures do not rise to levels that
require anything more than board approval for most publicly-held oil and
gas companies.
III. Do STATUTORY PROCEDURES APPLY TO VIRTUAL MERGERS?
A. Statutory Merger and Acquisition Provisions
Shareholder democracy has finite boundaries. Unless the articles of
incorporation provide otherwise (which they rarely do), shareholders do not
vote except on matters specifically prescribed in the statute of the state of
incorporation. Thus, unless the transaction comes within the specific
purview of a statutory provision, there is no statutory mandate for a
shareholder vote. A board can decide to present a non-mandated matter to
the shareholders, but such decisions are rare. Shareholder voting
procedures trigger substantial disclosure requirements," cause significant
delays and costs, and may open the door to opposition by institutional
investors and litigious shareholders. Hence, recourse to shareholder
approval is usually invoked only in statutorily required circumstances.
The statutory provisions are exclusive unless shareholder voting is
otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or shareholder
agreement. If a proposed transaction does not fit into one of the statutory
pigeonholes, no shareholder vote is required. Shareholder appraisal rights
also would not apply as appraisal rights are generally tied to voting rights. 9
The triangular merger is a prime example of the narrow application
of statutory standards. Shareholders of the parent corporation in a
triangular merger have no statutory right to vote because their corporation
is technically not a party to the merger. Although shareholders of an
acquiring corporation might have voting and appraisal rights if the target
corporation merged directly into it, no voting or appraisal rights exist if the
target merges into the acquiring corporation's subsidiary. The avoidance
of a shareholder vote through the triangular merger has resulted in both
"See id. at 463, 552.
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2001) and regulations thereunder,
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litigation and some statutory reform. In Terry v. Penn Central Corp.,6" a
preferred shareholder of Penn Central sought voting and appraisal rights in
a proposed merger between a wholly-owned subsidiary of Penn Central and
a target corporation.6' Under the merger terms, target company share-
holders would receive Penn Central preference shares. Plaintiff argued that
the transaction was equivalent to a merger between Penn Central and the
target corporation and therefore triggered voting and appraisal rights for
Penn Central shareholders. The court held that the Pennsylvania voting and
appraisal provisions applied only to shareholders of corporations that were
parties to the merger. 2 Shareholders of parent corporations therefore are
unlikely to have a voice in triangular mergers unless statutes expressly
require shareholder voting in triangular merger proposals.63 Statutory
provisions can be readily interpreted and applied to triangular mergers;
however, virtual mergers do not fit into any statutory norm. Contrary to
mergers or consolidations, virtual mergers do not result in a "survivor"
corporation," nor in a merging corporation ceasing to exist," nor in the
transfer by operation of law of property and liabilities from one corporation
to another.66 Virtual mergers are also not analogous to share exchanges, for
shareholders retain their shares in their respective entities. Given the
limited voting rights accorded to shareholders in corporate statutes, it is
difficult to argue that statutory merger provisions encompass virtual-merger
type transactions.
B. The Sale of Assets Analogy
Sale of assets provisions appear more analogous to virtual mergers
than statutory merger provisions because they mandate a shareholder vote
60668 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1981).611d. at 188-89.
621d. at 192-93 ("At the consummation of the proposed merger plan here, both Holdings
and Penn Central would survive as separate entities, and it would therefore appear that Penn
Central is not a party within the meaning of the Section 907."). Plaintiffs argument on a "de facto
merger" theory was also rejected by the court, based on statutory revisions by the Pennsylvania
legislature intended to negate earlier de facto merger decisions. Id at 193-94.
63CAL. CORP. CODE § 181 (2001)
"MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.07(a)(l) (2002).
"Id. § 11.07(a)(2).
"Id. § 11.07(a)(3)-(4). Consolidation is not a term generally found in corporate statutes.
The concept of two companies merging into a common third company is covered by the same
provisions addressing companies that merge into each other. In a consolidation there are two
mergers, not one, with each of the combining entities merging into the surviving combined entity.
For discussion regarding the distinction between consolidations and mergers, see 15 WILLIAM
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 7041 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999).
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to approve a proposal to "sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose" of all
or substantially all of the corporate assets.67 Since one of the hallmarks of
virtual mergers is that assets remain within the joint control of each of the
combining entities, it is difficult to interpret a virtual merger transaction as
involving a "sale," "lease," or "exchange of assets."6 That leaves for
consideration the statutory phrase "otherwise dispose."6 9 Inasmuch as a
virtual merger creates a potentially long-term shift from sole control to
shared control of assets, does this change in control constitute a
"disposition" of assets?
There is no statutory definition of the disposition concept. The
venerable Black's Law Dictionary defines "disposition" as a "transferring
... to another's care or possession," a definition that arguably applies to
virtual mergers, and also as a "relinquishing of property," which arguably
does not apply.7 disposition is presumably somewhat analogous to the
listed triggering transfers noted in the statute. Guidance might therefore be
gained by examining the statutory exceptions to a shareholder vote in asset
transactions.
The MBCA excludes the following asset transactions from
shareholder approval:
(1) dispositions "in the usual and regular course of business;"
(2) mortgages, pledges, dedications to the repayment of indebtedness,
and other encumbrances whether or not in the usual and regular
course of business;
(3) transfers of assets to wholly-owned subsidiaries or other entities; and
(4) pro rata distributions of assets to shareholders.7
67MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02 (2001). Most state statutes to use the "all or
substantially all" standard to determine shareholder voting rights. In 1999, the MBCA was
amended to adopt a twenty-five percent test, i.e. if a corporation retained at least twenty-five
percent of assets and income producing activities, no shareholder vote would be required. To
date, few states have adopted the revised MBCA version.68That is not to say that transactions might not be "sales" despite the lack of title
conveyance. In Wilson v. Whinery, 678 P.2d 354, 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), a lease of a parcel
along with the conveyance of an easement over that parcel was deemed to be a "sale" for purposes
of invoking plaintiffs right of first refusal.69Delaware, not a Model Act state, limits its provision to sales, leases, and exchanges.
No statutory reference is made to any other transfer or general disposition. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 271 (2001).
70BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (7th ed. 1999).
7 1MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.01(l)-(4) (2002). States that do not follow the MBCA
model might not differentiate between dispositions that are or are not in the usual or regularcourse
of business. Delaware, for example, makes no such distinction. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271
(2001).
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A virtual merger transferring management control over a substantial
portion of the company's assets is unlikely to be a transaction in the "usual
and regular course of business." Case law and commentary suggest that the
''usual and regular course of business" concept is limited to companies
organized for the purpose of acquiring and selling large portions of their
assets on a continuing basis, such as real estate development companies.72
A virtual merger also does not qualify as a transfer of assets to a wholly-
owned subsidiary or other entity. Virtual mergers involve the joint
management and control of assets, and a transfer of assets would be to a
jointly-owned or managed entity, not a wholly-owned subsidiary. Neither
of the other two exceptions to shareholder voting come close to describing
a virtual merger transaction.
The retention of a degree of control over contributed assets does not
preclude application of the statutory transfer provisions. In Campbell v.
Vose," the question arose whether the transfer of operating assets from a
parent to a wholly-owned subsidiary involved a sale or other disposition
of assets.74 The parent company argued that it continued to exercise control
over the assets and thus continued to use and possess them.7 ' The appellate
court rejected that argument, noting that the parent had divested itself of
title and possession of the assets.76 Thus, shareholder approval of the
transfer was required. Campbell v. Vose involved an express transfer of
title in exchange for the subsidiary's stock. Virtual mergers could similarly
involve express transfer of title to jointly-owned management companies.
Even if title does not pass, control over the use of the assets is transferred.
The policy evidenced in Campbell v. Vose might have application to virtual
mergers, because a shareholder vote was required even though the parent
company retained indirect control of the assets through its subsidiary.
Two factors favor analogizing sale of asset transactions to virtual
mergers: the change in control over assets (1) is not in the usual and
72See Gottschalkv. Avalon Realty Co., 23 N.W.2d 606,608-09 (Wis. 1946) (holdingthat
a corporation organized to deal in real property may sell all of its property without shareholder
approval). MBCA Commentary cites as examples of usual and regular dispositions the sale of
a building by a corporation formed for the purpose of constructing and selling that building, sale
of an entire business by a corporation formed to buy and sell businesses (and use of the proceeds
to acquire another business), and investment companies whose portfolios turn over many times
in short periods. 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT Ann., Official Comment, MBCA § 12.01 (1998-
1999).
1 515 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1975).
741d. at 259.
"Id. ("[T]he property which [sic] was transferred is still subject to the Company's use,
possession and control .... ") (quoting company's brief).
61d. ("An exchange for stock and for evidence of indebtedness was made, and the indicia
of ownership were held by the subsidiary.").
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ordinary course of business, and (2) might involve all or substantially all
of the operating assets." The fact that a shareholder vote is required when
corporations lease their assets belies the notion that the transfer must be
permanent in order to invoke shareholder voting rights. 8 Moreover, courts
tend to emphasize a "qualitative" examination of an asset transaction to
determine whether a shareholder vote is required. Thus, a sale of fifty-one
percent of the company's assets was regarded as sufficient to warrant a
shareholder vote because the transfer likely constituted a significant
departure from the company's historically successful line of business. 9
In the context of a virtual merger, a requirement for a shareholder
vote could also be supported by a qualitative analysis. The identify and
quality of management is a dominant element in investment decisions. A
transaction that results in management's control loss of sole control over
assets through the formation of ajointly-managed entity would, to use the
terminology from asset transfer cases, cause a "qualitative" change in the
shareholders' relationship with the company. Although shareholders risk
poor business decisions by management, they cannot be said to have agreed
to risk decisions made by persons not originally within company's
management.
The following hypothetical illustrates the significance of the
qualitative element. Assume that Company A and Company B both engage
in research and development of biomedical products. Their research
facilities are their largest assets, neither company has yet to produce a
significant product, and both companies face substantial cash shortages.
For economic reasons, the companies agree to assign the use, but not
ownership, of their research facilities to a jointly-controlled LLC for a
two-year period, thereby reducing overlapping research facilities and
"Some virtual mergers will involve only a single division of a company or a single line
of business. In those instances, whether the "all or substantially all" standard applies will depend
on qualitative and quantitative factors. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 605-06 (Del.
Ch.), affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974):
While it is true that [the all or substantially all] test does not lend itself to a strict
mathematical standard to be applied in every case, the qualitative factor can be
defined to some degree .... If the sale is of assets quantitatively vital to the
operation of the corporation and is out of the ordinary [course] and substantially
affects the existence and purpose of the corporation, then it is beyond the power
of the Board of Directors.
Id.
"MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 12.02(a) (2002) ("A sale, lease, exchange, or other
disposition of assets... requires approval of the corporation's shareholders .... ").
'Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1981). Accord, Cyrix Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1200, 1211 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
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sharing all related costs."' Any product created during the two-year period
would be jointly owned and marketed. After two years, the facilities and
personnel would be divided between the companies based on a valuation
formula. In these circumstances, shareholders of each company are
significantly affected by the transaction. Control over product develop-
ment, a principal element in a shareholder's investment decision, has been
reduced from 100% internal control to a 50-50 shared arrangement.
Although the research assets were not sold, their possession and use have
been significantly altered, as has the economic impact of any newly
developed products. Although one may argue that technically there has
been no sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of assets, the qualitative
result of the transaction represents a material alteration in shareholder
expectations and potential economic return. Independence in direction and
product development has been compromised. Diminution of control over
research assets might be considered to "strike at the heart of the corporate
existence and purpose."'"
C. The De Facto Merger Doctrine
Companies that combine their principal operations while remaining
technically independent achieve a functional result equivalent to an actual
merger. When this occurs, shareholders seeking approval and appraisal
rights might invoke the de facto merger doctrine. This doctrine is grounded
in equity, and therefore does not depend on statutory interpretation.
Rath v. Rath Packing Co. illustrates the role of equity in mandating
voting requirements. 2 Rath and Needham Packing Co. were publicly-held
companies thatjoined in a functional merger without employing statutory
merger procedures.8 3 The boards of the two corporations entered into an
agreement, called a Plan and Agreement of Reorganization, under which
Rath would issue to Needham shares of Rath common stock and a newly-
created preferred stock. Rath would acquire all Needham's assets, assume
Needham's liabilities, and assure the election of two Needham
representatives to the Rath board."' Needham agreed to dissolve and to
distribute the Rath shares to its shareholders. Although Needham appeared
'As previously noted, the antitrust concerns regarding such arrangements are not the
subject of this article. Many combinations, however, will avoid antitrust challenge because of the
lack of market dominance.
"Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 606.
2136 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965).
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to be the target, and Rath the acquiring and surviving company, the number
of shares issued by Rath to Needham and redistributed to Needham
shareholders gave Needham shareholders voting control of Rath."5 The
new corporation consisted of the combined assets and liabilities of both
companies, and was controlled by the former shareholders of Needham.
Rath's shareholders were asked to vote on three aspects of the transaction:
(1) amendments to the articles of incorporation authorizing additional
shares of common stock and the new class of preferred, and (2) a change
of corporate name to Rath-Needham Corporation, and (3) the election of
two Needham officers as Rath directors. These proposals received 60.1%
shareholder approval, which was sufficient to approve the proposals but
short of the two-thirds vote required by Iowa statute to approve a merger.1
6
Plaintiff shareholders argued that the two-thirds merger vote requirement
was the appropriate standard, and that Rath's shareholder vote was
insufficient to authorize the proposed transaction."'
Defendant Rath Corporation's principal argument, accepted by the
trial court, was that it was not required to comply with the merger
provisions of the Iowa statute if it could achieve its intended results through
the amendment and authorization procedures actually used."s , The
corporation raised an "equal dignity" argument, asserting that all statutory
provisions are independent and of equal standing. Thus, it was legally
permissible to achieve a result under one set of provisions even if
alternative provisions could have been used. 9 The "equal dignity"
argument was not without persuasive precedent, having been adopted by
the Delaware Supreme Court two years earlier.9" The Iowa Supreme Court
was not impressed by the Delaware position, however, noting that the
Delaware opinion "contains little discussion and cites no authority that
supports the decision."9 While agreeing that each statutory provision was
of equal dignity, the Iowa court held that the challenged transaction must
5Md.




The principal point of law defendants asked to have adjudicated... is that the
provisions of chapter 496A... are legally independent of, and of equal dignity
with, those relating to mergers and the validity of the action taken by defendants
is not dependent upon compliance with the merger sections under which the
same result might be attained.
9°Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (holding that sale of assets
provisions and merger provisions are of"equal dignity" and framers of a reorganization can resort
to either type of corporate mechanics to achieve their desired end.).
9
'Rath, 136 N.W.2d at 414.
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be viewed in the context of the entire statute.9" The Rath-Needham
agreement was characterized by the court as "a merger of Rath and
Needham under any definition of merger we know."93  The court
recognized that, in requiring the application of the statutory merger
provisions, it was favoring one process over another, but it supported its
conclusion with the equitable principle that "regards substance rather than
form. 94  Having reached the conclusion that the substance of the
transaction was a merger, it was a short step for the court to require
application of the merger voting requirements.
The Rath case may have been the high-water mark of the de facto
merger doctrine, because there have been few subsequent decisions in
which courts have so boldly sidestepped express statutory provisions.9"
The paucity of case law may be due in part to the influence of Delaware
law and the "equal dignity" doctrine,96 and in some measure to a reluctance
by corporate lawyers to plan transactions that may entail the risk of the de
facto merger doctrine and the imposition of equitable remedies.
An attempt to assert a de facto merger doctrine in a virtual merger
context would meet serious obstacles. Cases in which the doctrine was
successfully invoked have involved an actual sale of assets and shift in
management control through share ownership. In most cases, the
transferring corporation was dissolved. Virtual mergers, on the contrary,
are cooperative ventures that do not result in a permanent transfer of assets
nor in the dissolution of either entity.
921d. at 414, 416.
9'ld. at 415.
94Id.
'Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958), is an oft-cited case supporting the
de facto merger doctrine. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, faced with an upside-down asset
transaction and claims by acquirer's shareholders asserting dissenters' rights not available as the
transaction was structured, described the rationale of the appraisal provisions to be
when a corporation combines with another so as to lose its essential nature and
alter the original fundamental relationships of the shareholders among
themselves and to the corporation, a shareholder who does not wish to continue
his membership therein may treat his membership in the original corporation as
terminated and have the value of his shares paid to him.
Id. at 29. Some courts have imposed a form of the de facto merger concept in asset transactions
where creditors of the transferring corporation have asserted liability against the transferee, thus
holding the transferee liable even in the absence of specific assumption of liability. See, e.g.,
Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding tort clainnt could
pursue claim against transferee); 300 Pine Island Assoc. v. Steven L. Cohen & Assoc., 547 So.
2d 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (permitting creditor to proceed with action against transferee
of assets liable for transferor's liabilities where same ownership interests continued).
96See, e.g., Hesston Corp. v. Kays, 870 P.2d 17, 42 (Kan. 1994) (adopting the Delaware
standard in light of the fact that the Kansas statute was modeled on Delaware law).
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The difficulty in applying a de facto merger doctrine in a situation
short of an actual sale of assets is illustrated by Good v. Lackawanna
Leather Co.97 Good Bros. Leather Co. and Lackawanna were under
common control and ownership. Good Bros. supplied leather hides to
Lackawanna.98 A merger was proposed by the two boards, but strong
minority opposition caused the merger proposal to be withdrawn.99
Subsequently, Good Bros. reduced its business operations but continued to
purchase hides for re-sale to Lackawanna. Several years later the
companies jointly established a new tannery. Site and building costs were
borne by Good Bros., and Lackawanna donated the machinery. A new
corporation was formed with Good Bros. and Lackawanna as the sole
shareholders. 0 Neither Good Bros. nor Lackawanna retained or engaged
in any other operations. Plaintiffs were shareholders of both companies
and argued that they were entitled to appraisal rights under a de facto
merger theory. Plaintiffs cited the close working relationship of the two
companies, the lack of any other businesses, and the shared use of assets.'0°
The court rejected the argument, noting that there was no transfer of assets,
no assumption of liabilities, no exchange of shares, and that both
companies retained their own identities, boards of directors, bank accounts,
and investments.'0 2 The court regarded appraisal rights as "predicated upon
a fundamental change affecting the organic character of the corporation,"0 3
and concluded that no such fundamental change had occurred. The court
specifically noted that "many of the economic objectives sought to be
accomplished under the proposed and rejected statutory merger in fact
[had] been achieved," but held that achievement of like ends does not
trigger the de facto merger doctrine.'0 4
The. de facto merger doctrine is to some degree an "eye of the
beholder" phenomenon. To one court, a combination might be viewed as
so functionally equivalent to a merger that voting and appraisal right
provisions should be applied. To a different court, the combined functions
97233 A.2d 201 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
"'Id. at 203. A majority of the shares of each company were owned by four shareholders,
who also controlled the boards of directors.
"Although the merger vote received the necessary two-thirds shareholder approval by the
shareholders of Lackawanna Leather Co., a sizeable amount of shareholders sought appraisal
rights. As a result, controlling shareholders of Good Bros. Leather Co. decided to scuttle the
transaction and voted against the proposed merger. Id. at 204-05.
"'Id. at 205-07.
'
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might not constitute a merger at all. Once it is accepted that the term
"merger" is subject to interpretation, there are no fixed parameters to
differentiate virtual mergers from other forms of combined operations.
Thus, except for the several jurisdictions that have specifically rejected the
de facto merger doctrine, the doctrine remains a potentially powerful
argument. The argument is not likely to prevail where companies combine
portions of their operations and retain significant independence. The closer
the arrangement comes to affecting the dominant aspects of the respective
businesses, the greater the opportunity for an equitable doctrine that
invokes substance over form analysis.
D. Delegation of Management Authority
Virtual mergers result in the transfer of decision-making control to
the joint management of the combining entities. In the proposed Coca
Cola-Proctor & Gamble venture, for example, an LLC would have managed
the combined snack foods entity, with each of the corporations owning fifty
percent of the LLC and electing fifty percent of the management.'
Although each of the corporations would have had some control over the
marketing of its products, neither would have had the plenary power over
its own assets that existed prior to the combination. The shift in control
may be more marked if one of the combining parties has only a minority
voting strength by reason of the respective valuations of contributed assets,
as in the RTZ-CRA equalisation agreement. 6
The extent to which directors may lawfully delegate their
management authority has long been an issue in corporate law. Manson v.
Curtis, 107 a case nearly 100 years old, continues to be a staple of corporate
law textbooks. The Manson court's dogmatic statement that "[d]irectors are
the exclusive, executive representatives of the corporation, and are charged
with the administration of its internal affairs and the management and use
of its assets"' 8 appears to be an overstatement in light of the modem
corporate structure. There is increasing judicial recognition that important
corporate decisions might necessarily be made by officers rather than the
board."°9 Statutory provisions recognize the power of shareholders to enter
'
05See supra note 17.
"°See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
07119 N.E. 559 (N.Y. 1918) (holding an agreement among shareholders to delegate sole
management powers to one of shareholder violated statutory authority of the board).
'I0 d. at 562.
'"See Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357, 365-66 (2d Cir. 1959).
As the corporation became a more common vehicle for the conduct of business
it became increasingly evident that many corporations ... did not normally
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into agreements that eliminate board authority over specified matters."'
Indeed, statutes today expressly permit the elimination of boards of
directors and the transference of board powers to third parties."' As a
result of both judicial and statutory trends, delegation of authority cases are
few and far between. Courts continue to hold that some acts are beyond the
powers of the officers alone," 2 but the delegation doctrine is not one of
corporate law's livelier issues.
Despite the trend away from a dominant, authoritarian board, the
delegation doctrine remains viable because of the specific statutory powers
of the board. Therefore, it cannot be wholly ignored. An officer's authority
is limited to acts that are usual and ordinary within the context of the
particular corporation."' It would be a stretch of legal logic to conclude
that a virtual merger that places a portion of the corporation's business
under joint management with another company is a usual or ordinary
decision. If a virtual merger decision is made at the board level, the
transference of control to third parties over a significant portion of
business operations runs headlong into the statutorily defined role of the
board. The board might assert that the business judgment rule supports its
action in the absence of bad faith, conflict of interest, or illegality, but it is
precisely the illegality prong on which the business judgment presumption
might fail." 4 The limitation on transferring authority is reinforced by the
Model Business Corporation Act provision requiring any transfer of board
powers to third parties to be approved by unanimous shareholder
function in the formal ritualistic manner hitherto envisaged. While the boards
of directors still nominally controlled corporate affairs, in reality officers and
managers frequently ran the business with little, if any, board supervision.
Id. See also Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (III. 1964) (upholding shareholder agreement
regarding amount of dividends and salaries); Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936)
(upholding shareholder agreement regarding continued employment of and salary to be paid to
general manager).
"OMODEL Bus. CoP. ACT § 7.32(a)(1) (2002) (authorizing unanimous shareholder
agreements that eliminate the board of directors or restrict the discretion or powers of the board).
Delaware permits majority shareholder agreements in closed corporations that limit board powers
or discretion.
"'.MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a)(6) (2002) (requiring unanimous shareholder consent
to transfer to "shareholders or other persons all or part of the authority to exercise the corporate
powers or to manage the business and affairs of the corporation").
"'In re ARKCO Props., Inc., 207 B.R. 624, 628 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997) (holding that
the president of the corporation lacked authority to file petition without board approval).
"
3Lee, 268 F.2d at 365 ("The rule most widely cited is that the president only has
authority to bind his company by acts arising in the usual and regular course of business but not
for contracts of an 'extraordinary nature.").
"
4Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that a
board decision to forego collection of debt violated federal statute and thus could not be sustained
under business judgment rule).
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agreement. 115 Board action that shifts fundamental control to persons not
elected by the shareholders could well be regarded as violating "the most
fundamental principle of corporate democracy, that management must
represent and be chosen by, or at least with the consent of, those who own
the corporation."' 6
One response to the delegation question is that the shift in control
might be only temporary and is definitely terminable. The ability to
reassert sole control narrows the potential adverse impact of the
arrangement. This suggests that the issue perhaps may be less one of
delegation of decision-making authority than one of the boards' continuing
business judgment as to whether the best interests of the companies are
being served by the virtual merger agreement. Moving the issue into the
business judgment realm relegates the issue to the board rather than to
shareholders decision making. However, the shift in analysis to the
business judgment rule might not be appropriate. It assumes that the
respective companies could terminate the relationship and reassert control
over their respective assets within a reasonably brief time frame.
Depending on the nature of the assets and the terms of the virtual merger,
termination might not be so easily or quickly accomplished.
The delegation problem exists even if the virtual merger arrangement
can be terminated on short notice and control over assets retrieved quickly
and efficiently. Termination implies a failure of expectations. For some
period of time during the arrangement, thejointly-managed assets might be
underperforming. There is inevitably a time problem in gathering and
assessing information, analyzing the merits of continuing the joint
management arrangement, negotiating potential solutions to existing
problems, and ultimately providing whatever notice is legally required to
terminate the venture and retrieve control of assets. The inability of the
board to exercise plenary powers over company assets during the
pretermination phase may raise justifiable concerns among shareholders
and creditors. Thus, the delegation doctrine may be a viable argument for
shareholder input despite the potentially temporary nature of the combined
operations.
.. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a)(6) (2001) (authorizing transfer by unanimous
shareholder vote to "shareholders or other persons all or part of the authority to exercise the
corporate powers or to manage the business and affairs of the corporation").
"
6Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962) (holdingthat board
cannot agree to a change in its control without concomitant shift in ownership of controlling
shares).
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E. The Fiduciary Duty Issue
A virtual merger might involve a conflict of interest among the
approving directors, such that a shareholder vote would be an appropriate
validation measure. The conflict could arise if management of the
combining entities will also serve as management of the joint operating
company. A virtual merger bifurcates a company, one portion remaining
under the sole management control of elected directors and the second
portion (thejoint entity transaction) coming under control of a management
team not elected by parent company shareholders. If there is an overlap in
management personnel, the principal statutory provision regarding conflict
transactions might literally come into play. This provision, common in
many states, treats as a conflict any transaction "between a corporation and
... any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in
which [one] or more of its directors or officers are directors or officers..... 7
Quite apart from the literal statutory language, one may well envision
potential conflicts in virtual merger transactions. The elected directors and
management remain in place for each of the functionally combining
entities, with a portion of the respective business assets of each of the two
entities shifting to the control of a separate operating entity. If less than
100% of the operating assets are allocated to the joint entity, three
businesses will exist- the combined business of the joint entity and the
residual business of each of the combining partners. To the extent that
managers wear two hats, one for the new entity and the other for the
preexisting parent corporation, the overlap will cause continual resource
allocation questions. Among the issues that can be foreseen are: (1) which
company should pursue financing opportunities; (2) whether profits derived
from joint operations should be retained wholly within the joint enterprise
or allocated to some degree to the parent corporation; (3) if new business
opportunities arise, whether they should be pursued by the preexisting
parent or by the new joint entity; (4) how much time and energy should
management put into the development of the non-combined portions of the
entities as opposed to the virtually merged portions; (5) if the joint entity
is not meeting predetermined goals, should assets from the non-combined
portions be used to shore up the joint entity; and (6) should the parent
corporation guarantee any of the liabilities of the joint entity. To put all of
""DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2002). Similarly, MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT § 8.60
(2001) defines a "conflicting interest" to include a transaction between the corporation and "an
entity... of which the director is a director, general partner, agent, or employee."
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this into a direct question-to whom do the overlapping managers owe
their principal fiduciary responsibilities?"'
The potential for conflicting interests does not itself mandate seeking
shareholder approval of a virtual merger. The fundamental test in a conflict
situation is fairness to the corporation. Indeed, shareholder approval would
not by itself validate a conflict transaction, although it would shift the
burden of proof regarding fairness to the challenging shareholders." 9
Consequently, shareholder approval is not a sine qua non for the validity
of conflict transactions. 2 Directors can choose to avoid a shareholder vote
and take their chances, if challenged, on their ability to prove that the
transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation. However, directors
would be undertaking a substantial risk by avoiding a shareholder vote, as
derivative litigation would most likely ensue in post hoc circumstances if
the intended synergies of the combined entities have not developed.
Arguments regarding the fairness of the terms might ring hollow in light of
actual results, thus making the directors' burden of proof a difficult hurdle.
Moreover, a director's immunity from personal liability does not extend to
conflict transactions in which the director receives a benefit,' 2' which could
apply if the overlapping managers received compensation or other benefits
from both the joint and independent entities. The wiser course, therefore,
'An analogous issue of conflicting interests arises where a company issues tracking
stock, thereby functionally dividing company assets and revenues among discrete company
divisions. Directors' fiduciary duties must take into account the existence of the tracking stock
and its separate group of shareholders. Decisions that affect both the parent company and the
tracking stock unit could raise conflict questions. See Jesse Drucker, Sprint Shows Pitfalls of
Investing in Tracking Stocks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2003, at C I (stating that Sprint board members
own more shares and options in traditional business portion than in tracking stock portion, causing
some stock analysts to complain about decisions that favor the shares of the traditional business
portion).
"
9Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994):
The initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party who stands
on both sides of the transaction. However, an approval of the transaction by an
independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority
shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the
controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.
Id. See also Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (finding that Delaware statute
removes an interested director cloud and provides against invalidation solely because ofa conflict,
but nothing in the statute sanctions unfairness or removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny).
'
2
°See generally Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987) (holding that a lack of
board or shareholder approval of a self-interested transaction does not invalidate transaction if
found to be fair and reasonable to the corporation.).
'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2002) (authorizing articles of incorporation to
include a provision eliminating personal liability for directors but not as to "any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit").
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might be one of full disclosure to, and approval by, shareholders prior to
the virtual merger transaction.
IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SHAREHOLDER CONSULTATION
AND APPROVAL
A. Doctrinal Bases for Shareholder Input
Multiple arguments exist regarding the purposes and limitations of
shareholder voting powers.'22 The debate is at least as old as Adolf Berle's
and Gardiner Means' venerable description of the dangers of separation of
ownership and management and the ineffectiveness of shareholder proxy
voting as a means to control management.' Recent years have witnessed
increased activism on the part of institutional investors, yet concerns have
also been raised as to whether institutional investors are likely to vote in the
best interests of the corporation. 2 4 The debate over shareholder voting is
consistently fueled by management's desire to aggrandize centralized
decision-making authority.'25
To speak of shareholder voting rights is somewhat of a misnomer,
even with regard to significant corporation actions. Shareholder voting
power exists on a spectrum. The validity of nonvoting common stock is
unquestioned. 26 Voting shares can be stripped of voting power through
amendment to the articles of incorporation. 27 In most states, shareholder
122For an excellent review of the literature and arguments regarding shareholder suffrage,
see Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases,
79 IOWA L. REV. 485 (1994).
123ADOLF A. BERLE& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) (rev. ed. 1967).
'
24See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445,466-67 (1991) (explaining that institutional voting power
may create agency problems for smaller shareholder similar to the lack of control over
management).
2 Oesterle& Palmiter, supra note 122, at 493 ("Managers and their lawyers have sought,
and predictably will continue, to neutralize the power of the shareholder vote. Increasing activism
by institutional shareholders will fuel managerial attempts to insulate themselves from the effects
of the ballot box.").
'
26See, e.g., Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 807-08 (Del. 1966) (holding that public
policy recognizes the separation of voting rights from beneficial stock ownership).
27MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.01(b) (2002): "A shareholder of the corporation does
not have a vested property right resulting from any provision in the articles of incorporation,
including provisions relating to management, control, capital structure, dividend entitlement, or
purpose or duration of the corporation."
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agreements can modify or eliminate shareholder voting powers. 2 In
merger and share exchange contexts, shareholders of the surviving
company often do not have approval powers.'29 Shareholders of transferee
corporations in asset transactions do not generally have approval powers,
regardless of the amount of consideration paid or shares issued to the
transferor. 30 In a hostile takeover context, shareholders of neither the
acquirer nor the target have formal voting powers. The variety of
shareholder voting rights and their potentiality for modification or
elimination render meaningless the notion of inherent shareholder voting
powers, thus weakening any claim of inherent stockholder rights in virtual
merger transactions.
It is not necessary to enter into a basic debate over the shareholder
franchise. Shareholder voting rights are fewer than their historical
antecedent. 3 ' They continue to be whittled down through legislative
amendments,' and for most shareholders of publicly-held corporations
voting rights are of relatively little value or consequence. All that
conceded, shareholders continue to have voting and appraisal rights in
many forms of mergers, particularly shareholders of target corporations.'33
There are substantial policy justifications for such rights, including the
potential impact of the proposed transaction upon share value, the
importance of full disclosure to shareholders of the material elements of the
transactions, and checks upon management accountability to assure that the
proposed transaction has been fairly negotiated. These justifications apply
equally to virtual mergers. Virtual mergers are extraordinarily unusual
transactions, beyond the normal scope of anticipated management action.
"'MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 7.32(a)(4) (2002) (unanimous shareholder agreement may
govern "in general or in regard to specific matters, the exercise or division of voting power by...
the shareholders"). The provision is not applicable to companies whose shares are listed or
regularly traded in the securities market. Id. § 7.32(d).
129MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 1 1.04(g) (2002). Approval of the merger or share exchange
by shareholders of the surviving company is not required, unless the articles provide otherwise,
if (I) the articles of incorporation remain unchanged (with minor exceptions); (2) each
shareholder of the surviving company retains the same number of shares with identical
preferences, limitations, and rights; and (3) shares issued by the surviving company do not exceed,
directly or on a convertible basis, twenty percent of the voting power of the shares outstanding
prior to the merger or share exchange. Id.
"'MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.02(a) (2002).
"'See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
"
2See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
"
3 Target corporation shareholders have voting and appraisal rights in all mergers and
share exchanges in which the target company shareholders receive cash, stock, or other property
for their target shares, although shareholders of the acquiring do not generally have such rights.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.04(g) (2002).
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Moreover, both of the combining entities are "targets" in the merger sense,
as both companies give up control of substantial assets and autonomy.
Professors Oesterle and Palmiter suggest that "[c]ourts nonetheless
have an institutional responsibility to determine expost whether acts of the
board violate arrangements upon which shareholders relied when they
invested." 34 Is it possible to determine a priori the control and
management arrangements upon which shareholders rely? The close
corporation presents the best opportunity to assess shareholder expecta-
tions. Indeed, in cases alleging oppression of minority shareholders, courts
have explicitly sought to determine the ex ante reasonable expectations of
the shareholders.'35 In larger corporate structures, where shareholders are
much further removed from management, shareholder expectations become
more attenuated. Most shareholders of publicly-held corporations generally
do not expect to have any meaningful input into company policy. If such
shareholders object to the company's direction or decisions, their objection
is best manifested through the sale of their shares. This is the primary
reason why appraisal rights are generally not afforded to shareholders of
publicly-held corporations.'36
It is not unreasonable, however, to conclude that shareholder
expectations do not encompass substantial reorganizations of assets and
management. These are far different in magnitude and type from ordinary
business judgments left to the discretion of management. A joint venture
to develop and market new products is within management's discretion,
assuming that the joint venture does not dominate or adversely impact upon
the companies' other business activities.'37 Shareholders are also well
aware that companies may decide to eliminate product lines, develop new
product lines, change marketing strategies, acquire smaller companies, and
'
34Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note 122, at 525.
'
3 See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (explaining
that a court considering a petition alleging oppressive conduct must investigate what the majority
shareholders knew or should have known to be petitioner's reasonable expectations in entering the
enterprise).
136MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b)(2) (2001) (excluding appraisal rights forsecurities
listed on the New York or American stock exchanges, the national market system of NASDAQ,
or for which there are at least 2,000 shareholders and a $20 million market value).
37Thus, for example, it would not be within the reasonable expectations of shareholders
of either Coca Cola, Inc. or Nestle that their approval would be required for their company's
decision to enter into ajoint venture to develop and market new products. The same would be true
forjoint venture among automobile companies to develop and market a new brand of automobile,
such as General Motors joint venture in China to develop an automobile for the Chinese market.
General Motors 2000 Annual Report, available at http://www.gm.com/companyl
investor information/docs/fin data/gm00ar/fsns4.html. In these instances each ofthe contracting
companies continue to maintain much larger independent business operations.
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sell major divisions. Management is accorded a broad spectrum of
discretion. Nonetheless, management's discretion is not boundless.
Shareholder approval has not been eliminated for certain acts of significant
impact. If a virtual merger is of such impact, then it would seem to be an
undue application of form over substance to conclude that the absence of
any direct statutory provision precludes submission of the proposed
transaction for shareholder approval.
B. Equity and the Shareholder Franchise
Recourse to equity's protection of the shareholder franchise might be
appropriate if a company's agreement to enter into a virtual merger were
regarded as a device to avoid shareholder voting. Although there are
evident business advantages to a functional rather than statutory merger, the
choice of transaction might also be dictated by a concern regarding a
potential shareholder vote and concomitant appraisal rights. Courts have
applied equitable principles to mandate shareholder voting in circumstances
where board action has deliberately or unreasonably thwarted shareholder
voting rights.
Delaware courts have been particularly sensitive to board actions
that, despite their statutory regularity, are deemed to be motivated in whole
or in part by avoidance of shareholders' voting rights. In Blasius Industries,
Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,138 a proxy fight by an insurgent group sought to gain
control of the company's board of directors. After proxy solicitation began,
the board voted to expand the number of director positions and immediately
filled the vacancies, thus assuring that any insurgent directors elected
would not control the board. The board argued that it acted within its
statutory powers to amend the by-laws, increase the number of board
members, and fill the vacancies. Although the board was correct as a
matter of law, the board's actions were invalidated by the court on equitable
grounds. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the directors'
acts was to impede the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise.'39 In
language that could arguably be transposed into a virtual merger context,
the court stated:
Action designed principally to interfere with the effectiveness
of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the board and
a shareholder majority. Judicial review of such action
involves a determination of the legal and equitable obligations
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of an agent towards his principal. This is not, in my opinion,
a question that a court may leave to the agent finally to decide
so long as he does so honestly and competently; that is, it may
not be left to the agent's business judgment. 4
Courts have been particularly sensitive to the dominance of equity
in protecting shareholder voting rights.' 4' Shareholder voting rights
regarding the election and removal of directors are fundamental principles
of corporate democracy.' It is a stretch , however, to analogize
shareholder voting rights in director elections to business combination
transactions that emulate mergers. Indeed, Delaware courts have
specifically rejected attempts to assert voting rights under a de facto
merger theory.'43 Hariton and its progeny, however, did not involve
transactions similar to virtual mergers. Hariton involved a traditional sale
of assets transaction in which the selling corporation received consideration
presumably equal to the fair value of the transferred assets. In virtual
merger transactions, corporate assets are transferred to the control of
persons not elected as the corporate board. Without any payment, value,
or other consideration coming to the corporation, a significant portion of
its assets are being shifted to the control of persons not elected by
shareholders, with the attendant risk that the assets could be adversely
affected through faulty management decisions. The extraordinary nature
of the virtual merger transaction suggests that the shareholder franchise,
along with the concomitant disclosure obligations, are a healthy check on
management decisions.
The Delaware Supreme Court recently asserted the dominance of
equity in the Omnicare case.'44 The court, reviewing several deal protector
devices intended to assure the completion of a proposed merger, stated that
"[t]aking action that is otherwise legally possible.. . does not ipsofacto
comport with the fiduciary responsibilities of directors in all
circumstances."'45 The Omnicare decision is particularly interesting in the
virtual merger context. The court found that a combination of factors,
including the target board's agreement to waive its fiduciary obligations in
the event of receipt of a superior offer, constituted a breach of fiduciary
duty. That breach resulted in effectively forcing shareholders to accept a
1401d. at 660.
"
41Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
142Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954).
143See Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963).
'"Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
101d. at 937.
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possibly inferior offer. The court noted that Delaware law "expressly
provides for a balance of power between boards and stockholders which
makes merger transactions a shared enterprise and ownership decision."
146
The notion of shared enterprise and ownership decisions among
directors and shareholders has particular force for virtual mergers. In a
traditional merger, target company shareholders receive cash or shares that
approximate the value of the shares they have surrendered. If target
shareholders dispute the valuation of their shares, appraisal rights are
usually afforded. 147 In a virtual merger, however, shareholders on neither
side receive cash, shares, or other consideration. The fortunes of their
companies have been dramatically altered, yet the shareholders have
received no value or consideration for the material change in
circumstances. If shareholder rights are afforded in mergers where
consideration is offered to shareholders, the "shared enterprise" concept
might apply with even greater import when functional mergers occur
without the offer or payment of any consideration.
C. Proposed Guidelines for Shareholder Rights
Throughout this article virtual mergers have been referred to as
involving "significant" or "substantial" transfers of assets and major shifts
in control over the use of those assets. It was admitted earlier that defining
a virtual merger is extremely difficult, if not impossible. The transaction
is defined by its effect, not process, and the effect is functionally, but not
legally, equivalent to a statutory merger. Under these circumstances, any
attempt to be definitive has been avoided. The "I know it when I see it"
approach, which has been used in the de facto merger context, 4 could be
justified by the fact that corporate law is no stranger to fuzzy standards, as
illustrated by the "qualitative" analysis used by courts in determining when
"all or substantially all of the assets" are being sold or transferred. 1 9 It,
however, may be important in this area to develop objective standards
rather than reply on case-by-case analysis or somewhat open-ended
terminology. Objective guidelines are particularly important insofar as
virtual mergers are difficult to distinguish from joint ventures, alliances,
and other cooperative measures that create operational links among two
companies. Objective standards also permit company management and
counsel to plan cooperative ventures with some degree of confidence as to
146/d. at 930.
""
7See discussion of appraisal rights infra Part IV.D.
1'Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965), discussed supra notes 82-94.
149Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. 1974), discussed supra note 77.
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whether such ventures are subject to shareholder approval and appraisal
rights."0
The principal factors in defining a virtual merger seem to be (1) the
amount of assets transferred, (2) the degree of control over those assets
retained by the transferor, and (3) the intended duration of the combined
venture. The following circumstances may appropriately require
shareholder approval in virtual merger transactions:
1. Significant Transfer: A transaction in which:
(A) 50% or more of the assets of the company (or such
assets that account for 50% of company revenues) are being
transferred to joint control;
(B) the company retains 50% or less management control
over the transferred assets; and
(C) the minimum duration is in excess of one year.
2. Significant Duration: A transaction in which:
(A) 50% or more of the assets of the company (or such
assets that account for 50% of company revenues) are being
transferred to joint control; and
(B) the agreement cannot be terminated for less than 2
years.
3. Analogy To Sale of Asset Transactions: A transaction in
which:
(A) 70% or more of the assets of the company (or such
assets that account for 70% of company revenues) are being
transferred to joint control; and
(B) management decision-making over contributed assets
is held by persons not elected by the company's shareholders
nor appointed solely by the company's board of directors.
The three standards are based on different premises. The first,
Significant Transfer, is based upon the concern that management control
over a significant portion of company assets has been ceded to third parties
for more than a minimal duration period. The fifty percent figure is below
the amount usually (but not necessarily) regarded as necessary to invoke
shareholder voting rights under sale of assets provisions."' The standard,
'"The corporate bar's desire for objective standards is reflected in the recent amendment
to the Model Business Corporation Act that sets a seventy-five percent limit on what constitutes
"all or substantially all" assets for shareholder approval purposes. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT
§ 12.02 (2002).
"'See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
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however, combines the fifty percent minimum figure with (1) an intended
duration of at least one year and (2) the ceding of dominant control over the
use of such assets.
The second standard, Significant Duration, applies to an agreement
that cannot be terminated and the parties restored to the status quo ante
until passage of a substantial period of time. If the arrangement turns out
to be less than satisfactory, the company will suffer economic
consequences regardless of the degree of control it retains over the assets.
Even if an unhappy arrangement is terminable before a minimum duration
period expires, managers of the joint company owe fiduciary responsi-
bilities to the joint company and might not be able to pull the plug quickly
or easily. This standard would also be applicable if there is no fixed
duration period, but the nature of the agreement indicates that some
reasonably long time frame is necessary before initial goals are achieved.
The third standard, the Sale ofAsset Analogy, is similar to the "all or
substantially all" standard found in most statutory asset transaction
provisions. The "all or substantially all" formula has not been employed,
the proposed standard instead favoring a numerical test that avoids the
head-scratching that arises when less than all of the material assets are
transferred." 2  The most significant element is the amount of assets
transferred to joint control. Insofar as management selected to control the
distributed assets will have fiduciary duties to both of the combining
companies, this form of transaction could have a substantial impact upon
the transferring company regardless of the degree of control retained by its
management.
Each of the proposed guidelines could be challenged on the ground
that they could trigger shareholder voting even when the assets involved are
less than the "all or substantially all" standard for shareholder voting on
asset transfers. The virtual merger combination is not a permanent transfer
of assets, so why should shareholders have voting rights greater than the
statutory transaction? The answer lies in the unique nature of the virtual
merger. When a corporation sells or transfers assets, it receives
consideration, and corporate management retains full control over the use
of that consideration. Thus, the sale of assets valued at $50 million
provides management with $50 million in cash or other consideration. In
a virtual merger, assets are transferred to the control of others outside of the
corporation without a concomitant return to the transferring corporation.
Shareholders who invested in a company with $100 million in assets now
have an investment in a company whose management controls, e.g., $50
1
5 2See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
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million in assets, and which has a contractual interest in, but not control
over, the remaining assets. Shareholders are always at risk that assets
might be lost through poor management or unfavorable market conditions,
but those assets remain under the control of directors elected by
shareholders. Virtual mergers remove assets from such control. Although
the contributed assets of the combining party and the intended synergies of
the combination could produce significant profits-indeed that is precisely
the intended result-the risk of loss remains. It is a risk for which no
consideration has been paid and whose outcome is controlled by persons
not directly accountable to the shareholders.
D. Appraisal Rights
The foregoing discussion has focused on voting rights by
shareholders. A distinct issue arises regarding appraisal rights. There is
much debate regarding the purpose, significance, and application of
appraisal rights."' The debate raises fundamental issues requiring
expansive scholarly exposition. That fray will not be entered. The policies
that support appraisal rights in merger contexts apply equally to virtual
merger transactions. Although there are distinct differences between
mergers and virtual mergers in terms of impact upon shareholders and the
corporate structure, both transactional forms have substantial effects on
company direction, policies, asset utilization, and shareholder value.
Shareholder voting and appraisal rights create an environment of
disclosure, justification, and accountability. Virtual mergers significantly
affect the future of the company and remove from shareholders
fundamental powers regarding the election of those who actually control
the corporate assets. A virtual merger could cause a substantial revision of
the revenue stream derived from the company's assets and the appropriation
of wealth from one shareholding group to another. Although a virtual
merger transaction might be entirely reasonable and beneficial to the
corporation, it is appropriately subjected to the prophylactic measures of
shareholder disclosure, voting, and appraisal rights.
153 For a doctrine that causes relatively little controversy in practice, there is a great deal
of debate regarding appraisal rights' function and place in the corporate world. An early challenge
to appraisal's role is in Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 Yale L.J. 223 (1962), in which the appraisal remedy was questioned as a vestige
of an earlier, outdated concept of corporate ownership. A recent review of principal articles, as
well as the exposition of an additional theory, is in Peter v. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in
Corporate Law, 39 B.C.L.R. 1121 (1998).
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The counterargument against appraisal rights focuses on the
terminable nature of the relationship and the continued, albeit reduced,
control by management over asset utilization. Those elements lessen the
transaction's long-term risk to shareholders, which in turn weakens
shareholders' arguments for an immediate cash-out exit. There is an appeal
to this argument, but it would require case-by-case analysis of virtual
merger terms to determine which fall over or under a somewhat ambiguous
line of fundamental change. A virtue of the current statutory policy is that,
with few exceptions, 54 appraisal rights are linked to shareholder voting on
basic corporate transactions, thus providing companies and counsel with
precise planning tools. An approach that differentiates among transactions
based on particular characteristics is likely to raise difficult interpretive
issues. In the prior section, a limited paradigm was suggested in which
virtual merger transactions would be subjected to shareholder voting.
Those standards should similarly trigger shareholder appraisal rights,
subject to standard conditions and limitations.'55
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate law has proven its ability on numerous occasions to adjust
to changing commercial circumstances. Examples abound in which courts
have applied equitable doctrine to defeat or modify rigid statutory
interpretation.
Virtual mergers present a new challenge to the application of
corporate law. They are not mergers in the traditional sense, yet they
involve such a significant alteration of a company's business that the
policies supporting shareholder voting and appraisal rights in merger
transactions should apply to the equally functional virtual merger. In the
absence of statutory amendments, it will be difficult to apply literal
statutory language to virtual mergers. The "sale of assets" provisions offer
room for argument where a substantial percentage of a company's assets is
being transferred to the joint control of the combining entities. However,
the statutory argument is a difficult one, given the continuing exercise of
some control over the assets by each of the combining entities and the
contractual right to terminate the relationship and reassert unilateral
control.
"
4 Delaware, for example, does not accord appraisal rights to sale of asset transactions
despite the requirement for a shareholder vote. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262 (2001).
...Appraisal rights are generally not available for shareholders of publicly-held companies
on the theory that the shareholders can obtain the equivalent of fair value through the sale of their
shares in the secondary market. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b) (2002).
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Judicial doctrine in areas such as de facto mergers, delegation of
authority, and fiduciary duties offers more promising bases for subjecting
virtual mergers to a shareholder approval process. These doctrine do not
interfere with directors' traditional ability to make major corporate
decisions without recourse to shareholders. Shareholder approval, and
appraisal rights, should apply only to transactions that emulate statutory
mergers in significant measures regarding asset allocation, shifts in control,
and duration. Subjecting virtual mergers to traditional shareholder
approval and appraisal processes will assure full disclosure and review of
potentially significant transactions. Due appreciation for shareholder rights
would be appropriate checks on contractually-developed virtual mergers
that are functionally equivalent to their statutory analogs.
